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Trends In Communist Propaganda

10 July 74

**Confidential**

**F B I S**

# **TRENDS**

**In Communist Propaganda**

**Confidential**

10 JULY 1974

(VOL. XXV, NO. 28)

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## U S S R

### SOVIET SUMMIT BEHAVIOR REAFFIRMS LEADERSHIP COLLEGIALITY

The Soviet leaders seemed to go out of their way at the recent Nixon-Brezhnev summit to demonstrate the collegial nature of the country's leadership organs. In addition to U.S. reports of lengthy Politburo meetings in the midst of the negotiations, there were other signs in Soviet media that internal checks and balances were affecting the conduct of Soviet policy. The media accounts of the talks and the official documents consistently reflected the image of a negotiating team on short leash, subject at all times to the oversight and review of the full collective leadership. Seen against the background of the historical stress on collegiality in the Brezhnev leadership and recent signs of conflict over policy and personnel, these signs suggest the presence in the leadership of a delicate balance.

Progress reports on the talks, the joint communique issued on their completion, and the statement of party-government approval of their results published on 5 July were all devoid of the stress on Brezhnev's "personal role" in improving U.S.-Soviet relations seen in last year's summit. At the same time, this year the media accorded Foreign Minister Gromyko greater prominence in the negotiations than before. Thus, he was listed along with Brezhnev, Podgornyy and Kosygin as a primary member of the Soviet delegation. Press coverage of the talks drew attention to the more or less equal role played by the four members of the Soviet "delegation." Thus, PRAVDA on 29 June carried three pictures of identical size showing Podgornyy, Kosygin, and Gromyko, respectively, signing documents in the name of the Soviet Union.

Collectivity was also prominent in the protocol aspects of the visit. This year Brezhnev joined Podgornyy and Kosygin in welcoming Nixon upon his arrival at Vnukovo airport and in seeing him off on 3 July. The three leaders, along with Gromyko, accompanied Nixon to the Bolshoi Theater on the 28th. In 1972 Podgornyy and Kosygin were alone in performing such functions.

Brezhnev nevertheless remained the prime Soviet negotiator on such thorny issues as SALT, as in 1972 and 1973. As in 1972, official dispatches reported separate Brezhnev-Nixon meetings as well as those between the President and other leaders jointly. And Brezhnev was accorded the honor of signing the arms accords on the summit's final

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day, as he had during the President's last visit. Brezhnev also spoke at both the Soviet-hosted formal dinner on the 27th and the dinner hosted by the President on 2 July, whereas these functions were performed by Podgornyy and Kosygin respectively in 1972. Moreover, the Brezhnev mini-cult of personality, which reached significant proportions during the recent Supreme Soviet election campaign, continues to be cultivated in the Soviet press.

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## CSCE

## MOSCOW LINKS U.S. TO SOVIET VIEWS ON TIMING, SUMMIT

Moscow in its followup comment on the Brezhnev-Nixon summit has sought to convey the impression that the United States has accepted the longstanding Soviet demand for a final, third stage of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) at the summit level as soon as possible. It has done so by playing down the conditional nature of the joint communique's statement that both sides "proceed from the assumption that the results of the negotiations will permit the conference to be concluded at the highest level." Similarly, Moscow has all but ignored the communique's passage which said that Moscow and Washington, in cooperation with other CSCE participants, would work "to find solutions acceptable to all for the remaining problems." In line with its pre-summit stand, Moscow has stressed the singular importance of a "successful conclusion" for the conference.

The Russian-language version of the 5 July party-government approval statement was identical to the joint communique in its discussion of the timing of the conference. However, the TASS English translations of the two documents were at variance. Thus where TASS English cited the joint communique as saying that the two sides were "in favor of the final stage of the conference taking place at an early date," the TASS English translation quoted the approval statement as referring to both sides working from the assumption that the "results of the talks will contribute to the speediest conclusion of the conference." The superlative form, in fact, is the more accurate translation--a more literal English rendering of the temporal clause would be "in the nearest future." The use of the English superlative echoes several routine-level commentaries prior to the Moscow summit which cited unidentified Western press reports to the effect that "the U.S. leaders support the idea of holding the third stage at the highest level and without unnecessary delay."

The approval statement ignored the communique's passage on the "remaining problems" of the conference, in keeping with the general Soviet line that the most fundamental issues already have been settled at Geneva with the agreements on such principles as the inviolability of borders. In denouncing the Western demands for progress in the cultural and humanitarian areas of the conference ("basket three"), Moscow has argued that the "problems" which remain can easily be resolved if there is the political initiative and will in the West to do so.

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Following the pattern set by the Soviet leaders' speeches preceding the summit, senior Moscow observers in their initial post-summit commentaries have strongly criticized these Western demands on such issues as greater freedom of movement for people and ideas between East and West Europe. IZVESTIYA's first deputy chief editor and West European expert Nikolay Polyanov, appearing on the weekly Moscow radio international observers discussion program on the 7th, asserted that these issues were "secondary." And PRAVDA's authoritative Yuriy Zhukov, in an article on the 9th reported by TASS, charged that certain delegations at Geneva were complicating the negotiations and making unacceptable and irrelevant proposals--complaints which were almost identical to those made by Brezhnev in his election speech on 14 June. Where Brezhnev did not single out the cultural and human contact proposals at Geneva as the contentious issues, Zhukov explicitly placed the "unacceptable proposals" in this category.

The Zhukov article certainly made clear the hardline Soviet position regarding Western demands for "concessions" on the dissemination of ideas and information. Moscow has not, however, publicized a threatening statement by Soviet ambassador to Britain Nikolay Lunkov. Addressing a London luncheon on 2 July, Lunkov was cited by the British press as saying that a failure of the CSCE could "mean a return to the past, to the tensions in the relations between states, to a cold war and even possibly to a hot war." It is not unusual for Moscow not to publicize comments made by its ambassadors, but Lunkov's remarks add to the Soviet psychological tactics surrounding their push for a conclusion to the conference.

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## CHINA

## CHOU'S ILL HEALTH CONFIRMED BY HOSPITAL MEETING WITH JACKSON

NCNA's 5 July announcement that Chou En-lai had received Senator Jackson in a hospital that day gave the Chinese people their first official word that the premier was ill. The hospital reception tends to confirm that Chou's recent curtailment of protocol appearances has been due to poor health, rather than political difficulties or preoccupation with other affairs. Chou's meeting with Jackson was his first appearance since 31 May, when he met with Malaysian Prime Minister Abdul Razak.

By formally announcing that Chou is in the hospital Peking appears to be signaling that Chou's health problems are serious, but that he is not incapacitated and remains able to receive selected foreign visitors. A front-page picture of Chou's meeting with Jackson in the 6 July issue of PEOPLE'S DAILY showed Chou, dressed in his traditional grey tunic, smiling and looking generally fit.

For the past several months Chou's protocol duties have been largely taken over by two of his Vice Premiers, Teng Hsiao-ping and Li Hsien-nien. Chou's health problems first became evident during the Peking visit of Senegal President Senghor in early May, when he apparently became suddenly indisposed and missed a state dinner, after which Li Hsien-nien substituted for Chou at all functions for Senghor. Later in May Chou failed to appear for most official ceremonies during visits to Peking by Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto and Archbishop Makarios. He did, however, take part in substantive bilateral talks with each visitor as well as in their separate receptions with Mao.

**JACKSON TREATMENT** Though NCNA's overall treatment of Jackson's trip conformed to the usual Chinese coverage for such high-level visiting U.S. congressional leaders and officials, there were some departures from past practice--in addition to the exceptional meeting with Chou in the hospital--that indicated special Chinese attention to the visit. Like previous congressional leaders, Jackson was invited by the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, whose Vice President Chou Chiu-yeh acted as the senator's main host and feted him at a banquet. Jackson also held talks with Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua and Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, and the latter feted him at a dinner.

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Unusual Chinese interest in Jackson's views was suggested by the fact that Assistant Foreign Minister Wang Hai-jung, an official with reputed close ties to Mao, attended his talks with Chinese officials. Though Wang has attended Chinese official sessions with President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger, she has generally not been noted at meetings with visiting U.S. congressional delegations. Peking also took uncommon pains to indicate that its interest in Jackson did not affect its relationship with the Nixon Administration. NCNA, in reporting Jackson's meeting with Chou, took the unusual step of reporting that Chou had asked the Senator to convey his regards to President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger. In contrast to its past straightforward reportage of meetings with U.S. congressional leaders, Peking also pointed up its differences with Jackson by noting that Teng Hsiao-ping had a "frank" conversation with the senator.

#### MINISTER WRITING IN NEW JOURNAL CALLS FOR EXPANDED PRC TRADE

In a landmark article written for a new Chinese quarterly journal, CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE, PRC Foreign Trade Minister Li Chiang has firmly advocated expanding commercial ties with other countries. Earlier this year the anti-Lin and Confucius campaign seemed to have produced debate within China over the proper role of foreign trade, but Li's article indicates that the debate has been resolved, at least for now, in favor of continuing the expansionist policies of the past few years.

Li claimed the movement to criticize Lin and Confucius "will certainly promote" economic growth and result in increased foreign trade. Perhaps in reaction to foreign speculation over the ideological campaign and the effects of Chou's illness on Chinese policies, Li also specified that "China's foreign trade is sound and reliable." The appearance of the new journal, which appears in both Chinese and English, serves in itself to indicate that Peking expects to maintain a substantial interest in foreign trade; no similar journal is known to have been published since the cultural revolution.

As excerpted by NCNA on 9 July, Li's article gave due attention to the traditional Chinese principle of economic independence and self-reliance, noting in this context Peking's success in overcoming "imperialist blockades" and "political and economic pressure of social imperialism," while stressing that this principle "under no circumstances" means pursuing a "closed door" policy. Li went on to cite an authoritative Mao reference in 1949 to Peking's desire for expanded foreign trade and noted the economic and political

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benefits China has derived from foreign trade since then. The article highlighted the "substantial" future potential in Peking's foreign trade because of China's "vast territory, rich resources, large population and flourishing socialist construction," and stated that trade must develop "in steady steps."

The article specified the importance of balanced imports and exports in future expansion, noting in conclusion that Chinese imports will be increased in step with the growth of Chinese exports. It also said Peking would never follow some international trade practices allegedly used by the Soviet Union, including attempts to attract foreign capital, exploiting domestic or foreign resources in conjunction with other countries, use of joint management with foreign countries, and efforts to "grovel for foreign loans."

**BACKGROUND** At the height of the anti-Confucius campaign early this year, complaints over the growing influx of foreign products into China had appeared in the Chinese media. Since then, however, Chinese leaders and media comment have taken pains to show that Peking's keen interest of recent years in expanded foreign trade remains on course.\* Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, in setting forth a position in favor of equitable international trade at the 10 April UN special session on raw materials, said that Peking's advocacy of economic self-reliance "in no way means 'self seclusion.'" In May the Chinese leadership and media gave heavy attention to a French industrial exhibit then in Peking, while last month NCNA went out of its way to cite a 3 June speech by Secretary Kissinger that lauded U.S. commercial exchanges with the PRC for adding to bilateral understanding and giving "immeasurable strength" to the process of normalizing relations.

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\* For an example of provincial Chinese interest in and involvement with foreign trade, see the TRENDS of 5 June 1974, page 23.

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## K O R E A

## DPRK, PRC NOTE ANNIVERSARY OF NORTH-SOUTH UNITY DECLARATION

DPRK comment on the anniversary of the 4 July 1972 North-South declaration on reunification was more extensive and took a harsher tone this year than in 1973, reflecting the current stalemate in North-South relations. Unlike last year, when only a NODONG SINMUN editorial marked the event, this time the North used the occasion to denounce the ROK and the United States in a number of forums, including a NODONG SINMUN editorial and editorial article, a Pyongyang rally attended by several Political Committee members, and a statement by the North's cochairman at the North-South talks. Reflecting the current gloomy state of North-South relations, Cochairman Kim went beyond the North's normal complaint in recent months that relations were "returning" to a situation like that before the 4 July joint statement, declaring that they had "returned." Speaking at the Pyongyang rally, Central Committee member Yang Hyong-sop went nearly as far, saying relations had "virtually returned" to the predialog state.

The Pak government came in for greatly increased vilification this year. Only the statement by Cochairman Kim was limited to last year's practice of referring to the South Korean "side" or "authorities," which was Pyongyang's way of conforming to the joint statement's stipulation that mutual slander be halted. The NODONG SINMUN editorial article went so far as to call Pak a "rank traitor" and a "wretch." The United States and Japan also came in for criticism, but on standard terms.

PEKING Chinese treatment of the anniversary, like North Korea's, was more extensive and at a higher level than last year, highlighted by a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial commemorating not only the 4 July anniversary but also the first anniversary of Kim Il-song's 23 June speech proposing a five-point reunification program. The 4 July editorial carried the first Chinese demand in several years for the "immediate" withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea, but the demand was not accompanied by any increase in Peking criticism of the United States.\* Evidence that the Chinese were carefully

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\* In its 25 June Korean War anniversary editorial PEOPLE'S DAILY called for withdrawal of U.S. troops, but with no time stipulation, and demanded "immediate" cessation of military aid. See the TRENDS of 26 June, pp. 19-20.

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tailoring their comment to make the point that they feel the time has come for movement on the troop issue was the fact that Peking made no other reference to the United States in the editorial, and Peking replays of DPRK pronouncements carefully excised most U.S. references.

Coinciding with this year's expanded treatment was a 3 July Peking rally attended by Peking chief and Politburo member Wu Te in support of Kim Il-sung's three principles and five-point program for reunification. The rally was the first Korean support rally held in China since July 1971 to be attended by a leader of Wu's rank. The Peking gathering concentrated its fire on ROK President Pak, with few references to the United States.

In replaying the Kim statement and the Pyongyang rally speech by Yang Hyong-sop, Peking carefully edited their remarks to exclude all criticism of Japan and most of their U.S. references. All of Kim's references to the United States were omitted except for his demand for U.S. troop withdrawal. With Yang's speech Peking went even further, omitting all U.S. references, including Yang's call for the South Korean people to demand the "unconditional, immediate withdrawal" of U.S. troops.

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## EAST EUROPE

## BULGARIA, YUGOSLAVIA CLASH ON MACEDONIAN ISSUE AT UN SEMINAR

Yugoslavia appears to have taken advantage of its role as host for a UN seminar on national minorities to draw attention to its perennial dispute with Bulgaria over the Macedonian issue. On successive days TANJUG reported highly unusual remarks by the Bulgarian representative defending his country's position and criticizing that of Yugoslavia and the lengthy reply of the Yugoslav representative. Monitored Sofia media have ignored the incident.

While the Yugoslavs have repeatedly raised the Macedonian issue, pointing out that the dispute is a source of irritation and even danger for the two countries, Bulgarian spokesmen have remained silent until now. Whether the Yugoslavs intentionally provoked Bulgarian delegate Yuli Bachnev to comment on the issue is not certain, but they clearly capitalized on his remarks to try to discredit the Bulgarian position.

TANJUG's coverage of the incident appears to be objective. In an apparently straightforward account on 3 July the news agency reported without comment the Bulgarian representative's claims that books and other materials handed out by the Yugoslavs at the seminar being held in Ohrid, Macedonia, contained misrepresentations of Bulgarian policy on the Macedonian situation. Denying the existence of a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, he warned against Yugoslav "interference" in Bulgarian internal affairs and against linking the Macedonian question to general bilateral cooperation. The following day TANJUG ran the more extensive remarks of the Yugoslav representative--a refutation repeating the standard Yugoslav positions. This was followed, according to TANJUG, by remarks from the Bulgarian that the seminar was "not truly the place" for such a discussion and by the remarks of the seminar chairman, a Yugoslav Macedonian, who also criticized the Bulgarian.

**BACKGROUND** The dispute, which has taken many turns throughout the history of the Balkan states, has been a major obstacle in relations between the two communist regimes, so much so that Tito and Zhivkov have not held direct talks since June 1967. The dispute became particularly acute in 1970, when the Belgrade media intimated there was Soviet backing for a spate of historical articles in the Sofia press depicting Macedonia as a part of Bulgaria. Although

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expressed fears of Bulgarian aspirations toward Yugoslav territory have diminished, Yugoslavia is currently concerned over Bulgaria's campaign to deny the existence of a Macedonian national minority in Bulgaria. At the 10th party congress in May Tito avoided criticism of Bulgaria by name but was obviously referring to the Macedonians when he criticized the "assimilation" of national minorities.

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## ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

## MOSCOW CRITICIZES "MISTAKES" OF PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT

Although Moscow is continuing to insist on the need for Palestinian representation at the Geneva conference, a 9 July Arabic-language broadcast by the "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress has revived past criticisms of disorganization and mistakes in the Palestinian resistance movement. Although this is at the lowest level of Soviet propaganda, it suggests some Soviet misgivings about supporting a fractured and squabbling Palestinian delegation at the peace conference.

Moscow would seem to be trying to score points with the Arabs by continuing to espouse recognition of Palestinian rights as a key point in any Mideast settlement, while simultaneously equivocating on the problem of a Palestinian role in Geneva. The Arabic-language service of Moscow radio has skirted the statement in the joint U.S.-Soviet communique that the question of "other participants" in the Geneva conference should be discussed at the conference itself. In agreeing to this language, Moscow seemingly backed off from its insistence on Palestinian representation. TASS commentator Kornilov on the 4th went out of his way to demonstrate that the Soviet position on this issue has not changed when he said he had "learned from well-informed circles" that in the U.S.-Soviet summit talks the USSR stressed the need for stepping up the Geneva proceedings, with the participation "from the very beginning" of Palestinian representatives. And IZVESTIYA, as reported by TASS on the 8th, declared that the Palestinian Arabs should have the possibility to shape their own destiny, and went on to say that the Geneva conference "can and should become" the most suitable venue for the discussion of their lawful rights.

Soviet difficulties with the disorganized Palestinians were made clear in Radio Peace and Progress' list of complaints against the movement. The commentary "regretfully admitted" that the Palestinians' "imperialist and Zionist" enemies were exploiting "all the organizational mistakes" of the movement, one of the "biggest and most serious" mistakes being that of opening fedayeen ranks to "everybody and his brother." The commentary repeated criticism expressed in a major PRAVDA analysis of the Palestinian movement in August 1972, complaining of the absence of a political party or united mass organization combining military activity with political enlightenment among the refugees and Arabs living in the occupied territories.

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Radio Peace and Progress also indirectly criticized fedayeen operations conducted from Lebanon in assailing the Chinese slogan that power comes out of the barrel of a gun. This idea, the commentary said, leads to mistakes in assessing the movement's capabilities at "times of fluctuation," isolates the moderate elements calling for a peaceful political settlement, and alienates certain sections of the population of Arab countries hosting the Palestinian movement.

Undertones of annoyance over Palestinian disunity were more guardedly expressed in a Bukharov NEW TIMES article (No. 23, 21 June) on the recent Palestine National Council session in Cairo. While Bukharov put the best face on the results of the session, he suggested dissatisfaction in concluding that the resistance movement would be the more successful the more united it became, the more closely it cooperated with the "progressive" Arab countries, and "the more realistically it approaches the political solution" of existing problems.

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## PORTUGAL

## USSR CAUTIOUS ON DEVELOPMENTS, NOTES COMMUNIST PARTY'S ROLE

In its treatment of Portuguese domestic developments over the past few weeks, Moscow has adopted a cautious and markedly aloof policy, largely avoiding original comment while presenting factual TASS reports and also replaying excerpts of statements from Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) officials and publications. This new approach is in sharp contrast to Moscow's previous policy, evident throughout the first month following the 25 April coup, of expressing frequent and manifest concern over the course of events in Portugal.\* Coinciding with several weeks of increased diplomatic activity that saw Lisbon establish formal diplomatic relations in June with the USSR and virtually all the East European states, Moscow's current approach is probably designed in part to avoid controversial assessments and too heavy-handed a show of interest in Portuguese internal affairs. It is almost certainly intended as well to help promote the interests of the PCP, both by publicizing certain PCP policies and statements of leading officials and by avoiding interpretative comment that could embarrass the PCP within the Portuguese political context.

**EXTREMISM DENOUNCED** Against a background of recurrent economic disorders and sporadic attempts by the provisional government to restrain militant political activities, Moscow's sparse replay of selected PCP statements has sought to depict the PCP as a moderate and responsible party which opposes "extremism" and which wants to play a leading role in bringing democracy to Portugal. One part of this effort has been to highlight PCP denunciations of various strikes and PCP appeals to Portuguese workers for moderation in making demands on the government. Typical was a TASS item on 20 June which cited a PCP statement urging workers to rebuff "those who take advantage of workers' grievances to put forward demagogic and unrealistic demands which the Portuguese economy is unable to meet at this stage." The statement also warned that "instigators" were attempting to alienate workers from the government and to create "a situation of discontent and violence which could be taken advantage of by fascist elements and reactionaries." On 24 June TASS carried portions of a speech by Alvaro Cunhal, secretary general of the

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\* See the TRENDS of 1 May 1974, pp. 7-8, and 30 May 1974, pp. 14-16.

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PCP, who stressed that an economic crisis could become the "main danger" to Portugal's achieving democracy and that the communists regard preventing such a crisis as "extremely important." Several other TASS items have carried denunciations of "opportunistic elements" and extremists on both the political right and far left, cautioning that these circles seek to profit from "anarchy and economic chaos."

COUNTERCOUP  
DANGER

In publicizing PCP denunciations of extremism, Moscow has continued, albeit in a subdued manner, to press a standing theme in its post-coup treatment of Portuguese events, namely that "forces of reaction" stand ever ready to return the country to a dictatorship. TASS on 21 June, for example, quoted Alvaro Cunhal in an interview with the French newspaper LE FIGARO as raising the specter of Allende's overthrow in Chile, applying that episode to the current Portuguese situation by warning that "Portuguese reaction has borrowed the experience of Chilean reaction in regard to economic pressure." Cunhal did not pursue the analogy with Chile, however, and was careful to note that "the Portuguese army is not the Chilean army." On another occasion TASS quoted Cunhal as saying that although the communists condemn the extreme left for "disruptive and provocative activity," the main danger for Portugal is from conservative forces and that "all efforts should be concentrated against the threat from the right, against reaction, against fascism."

Both Moscow and the PCP have been reluctant to analyze and comment on the fluid political situation, except in highly general terms. A common assessment is that the situation is "complicated," marked by "numerous contradictions," and could lead either to further democratization or a return to dictatorship. The implications of such a state of affairs for the PCP were seen by the party's weekly organ AVANTE, in a lead article which TASS highlighted on 8 June, as requiring the PCP to pursue "an extremely flexible but at the same time cautious policy, because haste and miscalculation may lead to a loss of all gains."

DIPLOMATIC  
TIES

As the USSR and East European countries were establishing formal diplomatic relations with Portugal during June, Soviet comment on this development stressed the "economic and cultural" advantages for Portugal and sought to suggest that the demarche was generated on PCP initiative. PRAVDA on 6 June, for instance, three days prior to the establishment of Soviet-Portuguese relations, cited a 5 June statement by the PCP Central Committee which declared that "it is time to come forth with an immediate initiative concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations with the

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USSR and the other socialist countries." Hinting broadly that the six-week delay in arriving at such a conclusion was due to concern over the future direction of Portuguese political events and Portugal's policies toward its African territories, the PCP statement did not mention that Portugal and Romania had already agreed to reestablish diplomatic relations on 31 May. Subsequent Soviet comment has praised the establishment of Soviet-Portuguese relations, emphasizing that it was a "logical" development after the 25 April coup.

#### MOSCOW, PEKING DIFFER OVER PORTUGAL'S AFRICAN COLONIES

Over the past several weeks Moscow and Peking comment on Portugal's relations with its African colonies has revealed diverging views about the significance of the 25 April coup in Lisbon for the territories of Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique. Moscow's position, reflected in Soviet leadership statements and media comment, as well as in the fact that diplomatic relations were established with Portugal on 9 June, has been to advocate full independence for the three territories and express cautious optimism over the prospects for Lisbon negotiating an end to its colonial rule. The Chinese, on the other hand, while also stressing the necessity of unconditional independence for the territories, have predictably taken a tougher position than the Soviets, urging continued armed struggle by the liberation movements until independence is achieved.

**MOSCOW** An indication of Moscow's assessment of the Spínola government's policies for the three colonies came in the Soviet leaders' official greeting to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit conference held recently in Mogadiscio, Somalia. The text of the message from Podgornyy and Kosygin, published in PRAVDA on 14 June, included a passage crediting the overthrow of Caetano with creating "new favorable conditions for the immediate implementation of the inalienable right of the peoples of these countries to sovereign and independent development." It also attributed the removal of the "fascist regime" in Portugal in large measure to the efforts of liberation movements in Africa and implied that the new government was not only ideologically different from the old, but was also likely to recognize the costliness of continued rule over these territories.

IZVESTIYA political commentator V. Kudryavtsev enlarged on the theme of guarded optimism about Lisbon's new African policy in a 25 June article. Warning that halfway solutions of semi-autonomy

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for the colonies could lead to a Rhodesia-style white settler breakaway, Kudryavtsev nevertheless concluded with the observation that new Portuguese Foreign Minister Soares' moderate statements on cooperating with the United Nations to find a solution to the colonial problem "inspires us with a certain hope" that such a solution may be found.

The Soviets have responded contemptuously to what they regard as a wholly irresponsible Chinese position on the liberation movements in Portuguese Africa since the ouster of Caetano. A Moscow broadcast to Africa on 28 June noted that in "the complicated situation that has arisen in Portugal and its colonies, extremism is dangerous," and accused "Maoists and groupings close to them" of "acting in the interests of fascism and colonialism" by adopting an inflexible position on liberation movement policies. This is consistent with what the Soviets have criticized as a generally anti-Soviet policy by Peking in the less-developed countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. An article by an analyst of Chinese foreign policy, G. Apalin, in SOVIET RUSSIA of 20 June, for example, rebuked the Peking leadership for "attempting to drive a wedge" between the USSR and its friends in the Third World.

PEKING Chinese interpretations of Portuguese Africa's future prospects reflect skepticism about the intentions of the Spinoia regime while criticizing the USSR for establishing diplomatic relations with Portugal. Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, in a 1 July banquet speech for a visiting Gabonese delegation, said that until Portugal grants unconditional, "total" independence to its territories, the OAU summit conference request that no state recognize the Spinoia government would receive the resolute support of "the Chinese Government and people." Recent Chinese comment has taken pains to stress the insistence of the Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique liberation movements on continued "armed struggle" for complete independence. NCNA observed on 2 July that despite the military coup, "the colonial wars waged by Portugal in Africa have not ceased."

Peking has also criticized the Soviet stance: NCNA on 30 June sharply attacked the "Soviet social-imperialists" for having "hastily established relations with Portugal" in "total disregard of the just voice of the African countries." Unlike the Soviet leadership message to the OAU summit, the greeting from Chou En-lai ignored the changes in the Portuguese African situation. His message, released by NCNA on 11 June, repeatedly referred to "great-power hegemonism," putting the Soviets in the same neocolonialist category as the United States.

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## NOTES

SOVIET-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS: Soviet media have not mentioned Brezhnev's "urgent message" to Egyptian President as-Sadat, reported by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY on 10 July, requesting postponement of a projected visit by Foreign Minister Fahmi "until October" so as to make sufficient preparations for the talks. Indirect acknowledgment of the Fahmi visit had come in a 6 July Moscow Arabic-language broadcast of a recorded statement by the new Egyptian ambassador, who remarked in conclusion that the visit of an Egyptian delegation to Moscow in mid-July would further bilateral efforts to develop mutual understanding and more active consultation and coordination. The Fahmi visit had been forecast in Cairo media since 19 May, when President as-Sadat received what he called a "cordial" message from Brezhnev "expressing the beginning of a more positive phase" in Soviet-Egyptian relations. Fahmi had confirmed the prospective visit at a cabinet meeting on 11 June, remarking that he would prepare a Soviet-Egyptian summit meeting, and on 19 June Fahmi said the date for the visit had been set in a letter from the Soviet leaders received that day. MENA announced on 9 July that the visit would begin on the 15th and that as-Sadat had received Fahmi to issue instructions on the talks and on composition of the delegation. Moscow has made no mention of the message exchanges.

USSR-WEST BERLIN-FRG: Moscow has issued its strongest criticism yet of the new Schmidt-Genscher government, in an IZVESTIYA article condemning the establishment in Berlin of the Federal Environmental Office, which was unanimously approved by the Bundestag on 19 June. The article by Grigoriy Sidorov charged "certain circles of the ruling FRG coalition" with attempts "to undermine" the Quadripartite Agreement on "West Berlin." Claiming that the Bundestag decision "flagrantly contradicts the letter and spirit" of the four-power agreement, Sidorov labeled it an attempt to upset the "balance" of interests negotiated in the four-power talks. He warned that those responsible for the decision would render a "dis-service" to the people of West Berlin. Moscow had earlier made public its view: TASS and PRAVDA publicized a 20 June GDR Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest on the "illegal" Bundestag decision and Radio Peace and Progress, in a German-language broadcast on 20 June, called the establishment of the office "an infringement" of the four-power agreement. Also, Soviet Ambassador to the GDR Yefremov, in a 10 June NEUES DEUTSCHLAND interview, alluded to the proposed office when he recalled for "some politicians in West Berlin and the FRG" that the four-power agreement was a fine balance of interests of the four powers. And a V. Zhigulenkov article in the 3 June IZVESTIYA had unequivocally asserted that "the stubborn attempts to open up federal agencies and organizations" in West Berlin were "illegal activities."

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NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION ABROAD: VNA on 5 July reported the departure that day of a DRV delegation led by Politburo member and Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi for a "visit to a number of socialist countries"--presumably the annual aid-seeking mission to Hanoi's allies which Nghi has usually headed. The delegation stopped over on 5-7 July in Peking, where it was hosted by Politburo member Li Hsien-nien, who has negotiated aid agreements with the North Vietnamese in the past. VNA on 7 July reported talks the previous day between Le Thanh Nghi and Li Hsien-nien on "scientific and technical cooperation" and China's continued "support and aid" to North Vietnam; a brief NCNA account of the talks, by contrast, did not specify their content. VNA's report on the delegation's 7 July departure from Peking indicated that it was going to the USSR for a "friendship visit," but the delegation only stopped over in Moscow and went on to Bulgaria on the 9th. VNA's sole report on the delegation's activities in Moscow was an item--also carried by Hanoi radio--indicating that Nghi had held talks on the 9th with Central Committee member N.K. Baybakov on the "strengthening and development of economic, scientific, and technical cooperation." Moscow's only known reference to Nghi's stopover was a brief radio report on the talks, broadcast only in Vietnamese.

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## CORRECTION

The article on the Cambodian Front delegation's visit to South Vietnam that appeared in the TRENDS of 3 July 1974 erroneously stated, on page 10, that the joint communique at the end of the visit reported a "complete similarity" of views. A recheck of the Cambodian news agency's French-language account of the communique revealed that this was a mistranslation and that it actually stated that a "perfect identity" of views had been reached on problems discussed. Liberation Radio's Vietnamese-language version of the communique similarly indicated that two sides reached a "complete unanimity" of views.

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# APPENDIX

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 1 - 7 JULY 1974

<u>Moscow (2735 items)</u>			<u>Peking (984 items)</u>		
Nixon USSR Visit	(19%)	28%	Law of the Sea	(10%)	12%
[US/Soviet Communique,	(--)	5%]	Conference		
Agreements			Criticism of Lin Piao	(7%)	8%
Soyuz 14/Salyut 3 Mission	(--)	5%	and Confucius		
China	(4%)	4%	Korea	(8%)	6%
Juan Peron Death	(--)	3%	[2d Anniversary of	(--)	5%]
Chile	(4%)	3%	North-South		
Algerian Independence 12th	(--)	3%	Reunification		
Anniversary			Statement		
CEMA 25th Anniversary	(2%)	0%	Cambodia	(2%)	5%
Session			[Front Leaders in	(--)	2%]
Arab-Israeli Issue	(3%)	2%	Laos, PRG Area		
			India-Sikkim Constitu-	(--)	4%
			tion Confrontation		
			CCP 53d Anniversary	(--)	4%
			Gabon Foreign Minister	(--)	3%
			in PRC		
			Juan Peron Death	(--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.